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In its simplest form, the rational choice theory of voting suggests that individuals are
motivated to vote because they can aect the election's outcome. It follows that turnout
is expected to be higher in elections where more is at stake and where a participant is
more likely to cast a decisive vote (Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968)). While
several studies have investigated how the expected probability of being pivotal matters
(see Blais (2000)), little attention has been directed to how the stakes of the election
aect political participation. In this paper we explore whether turnout rates vary with
the benets of being pivotal: do more people vote when the stakes are high?
An election's stakes depend on how strongly the winning candidate can inuence
outcomes that voters care about. A key determinant of a politician's inuence is the
budgetary constraints that he or she will face in oce, which in general cannot be taken
as exogenous. Our approach to handling the endogeneity of electoral stakes is to uti-
lize variation in local government (municipality) revenue in Norway from hydropower
production, which is largely determined by geography. Higher revenue from hydropower
production equips elected ocials with more funds to distribute, and thus aects the
stakes of the local election.1
Our identication strategy exploits the Norwegian institutional feature that elections
for the local and regional governments are held simultaneously, with identical sets of
eligible voters. By focusing on the dierence in voter turnout in the two elections|the
turnout dierence hereafter|our estimates are unlikely to be biased by (unobserved)
population characteristics.
Our main nding is that extra revenues from taxing hydropower production increases
turnout in the local election relative to the regional election. This nding is remarkably
robust. It is visible in the raw data, and it does not disappear as we gradually control
for an extensive list of local characteristics known from the rational choice literature to
1Hgeland, Raaum, and Salvanes (2008) use the same source of variation to identify eects of school
resources on pupil achievement.
2aect turnout. Furthermore, while these observables do explain turnout levels, they have
only a small impact on turnout dierences. Hence, in order for our qualitative nding to
be driven by unobservables, these must both be correlated with hydropower income, and
inuence the turnout dierence far more strongly than observables do. We argue that
this is not likely to be the case.
Quantitatively, we nd that if hydropower tax revenue increases from zero to its
maximum level, the turnout dierence responds with about 6 percentage points. The
estimates imply that it takes around 9;000 Norwegian kroner (USD 1500) to increase
voter participation by 1 percentage point in the local election relative to the regional
one. We consider this a lower bound of the causal eect of interest. The reason is that
if hydropower tax revenues triggers people to vote in the local election, this is also likely
to reduce the cost of voting in the regional election, since voting for both elections takes
place in the same voting booth. In the elections we study, voters may cast preferential
votes for specic candidates. As a robustness check, we therefore investigate whether
hydropower income also motivates voters to alter the parties' lists of candidates. The
evidence suggests that it does.
In terms of Downs' \calculus of voting" model, our results only make sense if hy-
dropower revenue increases the incentive to vote at the local level relative to the regional
level. Of course, in theory this need not be the case. As resource wealth feeds into greater
provision of public goods by the local government, the marginal utility of these goods
is likely to decline, reducing how strongly voters' prefer one candidate's prioritization of
public goods relative to another candidate's choices. On the other hand, if extra revenues
instead are used for purposes targeted at particular recipients, or pork barrel spending,
it becomes more important to vote in the local election.2 We therefore inspect how local
revenues derived from hydropower taxation relate to local spending priorities. The data
reveals that the two core welfare services that local governments must provide (education
and elderly care) are downprioritized relative to noncore expenditure categories such as
2A related argument is made by Schwartz (1987).
3local roads, cultural activities and industry support. Thus, the spending pattern appears
consistent with the hypothesis that hydropower income raises the instrumental incentive
to vote in the local election.
The literature on voter motivation is vast, and a survey is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. In short, a broad distinction is made between theories that focus on the instrumental
motive to vote and theories where the act of voting in itself generates utility (Dhillon
and Peralta (2002)). It is well understood that the \calculus of voting" framework can-
not explain observed turnout levels in large-scale elections (for instance, Schachar and
Nalebu (1999)). Our analysis ts into this literature, as we show that the instrumental
motive to vote may still matter on the margin (as suggested by Blais (2000), Dowding
(2005) and Geys (2006b)).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional
setting and assess how revenues from hydropower taxes are spent. Section 3 uses a simple
version of the pivotal voter model to obtain an empirical strategy for estimating the eect
of hydropower income on turnout. The data and our empirical specication are presented
in section 4. Section 5 gives the results for voter turnout, while in section 6 we conduct
a brief analysis of preferential votes. Section 7 explores the robustness of our main result
and Section 8 addresses potential endogeneity issues applying an instrumental variable
approach. Section 9 concludes.
2 Fiscal Eects of Hydropower
The central question we explore in this paper is how hydropower income aects voter
turnout in local elections. A priori, it is not obvious whether hydropower income will
increase or reduce the instrumental motive to vote. On the one hand, if hydropower-rich
governments simply use their extra revenues to provide more of the same basic welfare
services as do poorer local governments, and voters' utility over these services is concave,
this income will reduce the importance of the local election to voters. On the other hand,
4if hydropower income triggers pork barrel spending that is targeted at specic recipients
in the electorate, this income source will stimulate the instrumental incentive to vote.
Hence, before we analyze how hydropower income aects turnout in a local election, it is
important to know how this extra income is spent. In this section we therefore describe
the institutional setting and how local spending varies with hydropower income.
2.1 Institutional Setting and Hydropower Revenues
In Norway there are three layers of government: the central government, the regional
governments (counties) and the local governments (municipalities). The main entities of
interest in this paper are the 431 local governments, which play an important role within
the Norwegian welfare state.
The local governments are mostly nanced by regulated local tax sharing and grants
from the central government. On average, this source of revenue accounts for about 80
percent of the total local government revenues. The remainder stem from user charges,
which are limited to cover costs only, and property taxation. In this study we focus on
commercial property taxation levied on hydropower producers. 3 Importantly, property
tax revenues are not redistributed across local governments.
Large hydropower plants are typically found in mountainous areas that receive sub-
stantial precipitation, and where glaciers have shaped the landscape so that hydropower
production is relatively easy. Hence, a topography that is favorable to production of
hydropower facilitates large revenues for local governments if they levy commercial prop-
erty taxes. 4 In 2007, 65 percent of Norway's local governments levied such taxes. The
tax rate is chosen by the local government, but cannot exceed 0:7 percent. Almost all
local governments choose to tax at the maximum rate (Hgeland, Raaum, and Salvanes
(2008)).
For most of Norway's local governments the revenues from commercial property tax-
3Local governments also have the possibility to levy property taxation on housing, studied in Fiva
and Ratts (2007).
4Hydropower accounts for 98-99 percent of total electricity production in Norway (Statistics Norway).
5ation are small. About two thirds of all local governments receive less than 4 percent
of their total revenues from this source. However, for some local governments, revenues
from commercial property taxation constitute an important source of income. In 2007,
37 local governments received more than 10 percent of their total income from commer-
cial property taxation. In per capita terms, the average revenue from this tax source is
about NOK 2;000 (USD 350). The maximum is about NOK 52;000 (approximately USD
9;000) per capita. As revenues from commercial property taxation predominantly stem
from taxing hydropower plants, we refer to this revenue source as hydropower income.5
2.2 Fiscal Flexibility and Spending Priorities
While their revenue side is relatively restricted, the Norwegian local governments have
more exibility concerning the composition of government spending, subject to a set of
minimum standards set by the central government. In 2007 local governments spent
on average NOK 67,000 (USD 11,500) per capita. About 57 percent was spent on the
major welfare services that Norwegian local governments have responsibility for, namely
child care, education and elderly care. About 6 percent was spent on traditional local
public goods (re protection and infrastructure). The remainder was spent on central ad-
ministration, social assistance, primary health care, cultural activities, industry support,
planning, and local roads. See Table 1 and 2 for details.
In Table 3 we present results from simple regressions where we relate spending per
capita to hydropower income for 12 dierent expenditure categories, controlling for pop-
ulation size and population share living in remotely populated areas in each municipality.
We nd that hydropower-rich local governments spend more per capita on every local
budget category. This is not surprising, and says little about how hydropower-income
aects spending priorities. We therefore continue by focusing on each expenditure com-
5Out of the 37 local government with more than 10 percent of their income from commercial property
taxation, 30 have major power stations (capacity above 10MW per hour). Three local government have
only minor hydropower stations (capacity below 10MW per hour) and four do not have any hydropower.
In these cases the property tax revenues stems mainly from sheries and oil industries.
6ponent as share of total spending, and explore how these spending shares vary with
hydropower income.
Results for spending shares are presented in Table 4. We see a systematic negative
association between the fraction spent on the two major welfare services (schooling and
elderly care) and hydropower income (again controlling for population size and density).
On the other hand, hydropower income is positively related to the shares spent on cul-
ture, industry support, planning, and local roads, respectively. All these associations
are statistically signicant at the 1-percent level. In addition we nd a positive rela-
tionship between hydropower income and central administration, but this association is
statistically signicant only at the ten percent level.
This spending pattern likely reects that most local governments without hydropower
revenues must spend most of their funds just to achieve the minimum standards set by the
central government concerning the provision of the major welfare services (for example,
maximum class size in primary schools). Local governments enriched by hydropower
revenues, on the other hand, have the nancial exibility to pursue interests beyond their
primary tasks.
The expenditure components that gain priority as hydropower income increases have
the common feature that they may be targeted at well-dened interest groups. For
instance, a larger administration is particularly benecial for those voters who gain em-
ployment from this. Higher spending on cultural services matters most for those who
produce them or have an appreciation for the these services. While industry support
may be useful for the local community as a whole, it is particularly useful for the recip-
ient companies. Furthermore, although roads are typically considered as public goods,
the roads provided by local governments in Norway are small and are not the main trans-
portation routes within the municipalities, which are provided by the central or regional
government. Instead locally nanced roads are typically utilized only by the residents
of the neighborhood where they are located. Finally, planning is a logical need as these
types of projects expand.
7A natural interpretation of the pattern shown in Table 4 is that hydropower income
allows local politicians to allocate resources to new purposes beyond the primary welfare
services that poorer municipalities must focus on, and that these new purposes benet
specic groups of voters. Hence, of the two opposing eects of hydropower income on
the instrumental incentive to vote mentioned above|providing more of the basics or
providing more of the discretionary services|the local spending patterns indicate that
the positive eect is likely to dominate the negative eect.
3 Theory and Empirical Strategy
3.1 The Model
f Consider the following formulation of the conventional \calculus of voting" model.












l;i is citizen i's probability of casting a decisive vote (indexed by L) and BL
l;i
is her subjective value of inuencing the election outcome, the \party dierential" in
the terminology of Downs (1957). Hence, the product, pL
l;iBL
l;i, is the total instrumental
incentive to vote. DL
l;i denotes i's direct benet from voting in the local election, termed
the \consumption benet" of voting by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), and CL
l;i is i's cost
of voting.6
6Even though DL
l;i was initially introduced as the \consumption benets from voting" by Riker and
Ordeshook (1968), it can be assigned the more general interpretation of a \catch-all" variable. In the
literature, the catch-all term has been associated with a range of factors that may give individuals util-
ity of voting per se, for instance: demographic variables such as age (Strate, Parrish, Elder, and Ford
(1989)), gender (Schlozman, Burns, Verba, and Donahue (1995)), marital status (Stoker and Jennings
(1995)), education (Leighley and Nagler (1992a)), income (Leighley and Nagler (1992b)); attitudinal and
behavioral factors such as general political knowledge (Galston (2001)), strength of partisanship (Huck-
feldt and Sprague (1992)), feelings of civic duty (Blais and Young (1999)), political trust (Hetherington
(1999)), church attendance (Cassel (1999)); social variables such as social pressure (Funk (2010)), group
consciousness (Miller, Gurin, and Gurin (1981)), political disagreement (Mutz (2002)), and social capital
(Lake and Huckfeldt (1998)); and institutional variables such as closeness of the election (Schachar and
Nalebu (1999)), party loyalty (Schuessler (2000)), contact from political organizations (Wielhouwer
8The probability of being pivotal can be interpreted in the traditional way, where
voters may be pivotal in terms of altering political representation. Alternatively, voters
may be pivotal by inuencing which group(s) within the community will receive patronage
rewards or local public benets (Schwartz (1987); Smith and Bueno de Mesquita (2010)).
When pork barrel politics dominate the local political agenda, this interpretation of pL
l;i
may be particularly relevant.
The terms CL
l;i and DL
l;i may dier across individuals. Hence, the net cost of voting,
CL
l;i   DL










l . Yl is a vector of local government specic characteristics that inuence the
distribution of net voting costs.
For expositional convenience, we assume that the instrumental incentive does not




l . The share of l's potential voters who turn







Now consider the decision to vote in the regional government election (indexed by R).










As for the local election, assume that the net cost of voting at the regional election,
CR
l;i   DR






. Assume also that the instrumental motive to vote in the regional election




l . The share of voters in l who vote in the
and Lockerbie (1994)), campaigns (Ansolabehere, Lyengar, Simon, and Valentino (1994)), and barriers
to registration (Rosenstone and Wolnger (1978)); and, nally, genes (Fowler and Dawes (2008)). See
Geys (2006a) and Degan and Merlo (forthcoming) for more comprehensive reviews of the literature. For
our purposes the exact interpretation of D is not important.
7Rather than assuming that individuals have the same pL
l BL
l , we could let them be heterogenous in





l;i < 0. However, because this formulation allows a less transparent representation of











3.2 The Eect of Local Government Income on the Turnout
Dierence
Within the model laid out above, local government income, Il, aects turnout in the local



















































































is the mass of eligible voters who are \on the margin" in
the sense that they are indierent between turning out and abstaining from participation
in the election. In the rst term of the expression, this mass is multiplied by the eect of
hydropower income on the instrumental incentive to vote, which is the expression inside
brackets. The total product thus captures how strongly a marginal increase in income
aects local election turnout via the instrumental incentive to vote.
The second term in (3) captures how Il may inuence turnout through an association
with local characteristics, hereafter referred to as the \selection eect". This eect de-
pends on how strongly hydropower income relates to each characteristic in Yl,
dYl
dIl , and
how strongly each characteristic in Yl relates to a voter's benet and the probability of
being pivotal (rBL
Yl and rpL
Yl) and the distribution of net voting costs in local commu-
nity l (rFYl). An intuitive example of this eect would be that local governments with
high Il attract citizens with a strong conviction that voting per se is important, and who









is a vector of the derivatives of F with respect to each component of
Yl.
10A similar expression to (3) applies for the eect of local government income on the
local turnout in the regional election. Hence, income will aect the dierence between
the local turnout in the local and regional elections, the \turnout dierence" hereafter,












































































is the mass of voters l who are on the margin at the regional
election, and rGYl is the gradient containing all the derivatives of G with respect to Yl.
As in the expression for turnout in the local election (3), we see two channels through
which income potentially aects the turnout dierence. First, local income may aect
the instrumental incentive to vote in the local and regional elections dierently. This is
likely to be the case since higher income at the local level raises the nancial exibility
under which the local government operates, but does not aect the nancial situation of
the regional government.
Next, there is the selection eect, in which the same relationship between income and
characteristics, dYl=dIl, now is multiplied by s
Y
l , hereafter referred to as the \selection
dierence". This term will be quantitatively smaller than the selection eect in (3) if
the eects of characteristics Yl on the consumption benets of voting, the probability
of being inuential, and the distributions of net costs of voting go in the same direction
for the two elections. Importantly, equation (4) illustrates that a selection eect can
aect the turnout dierence only if income is related to local characteristics and these
11characteristics inuence individuals' propensity to vote at the regional election dierently
from their propensity to vote in the local election.
3.3 Local Government Income and the Instrumental Incentive
to Vote
The spending patterns documented in Section 2 suggested that hydropower income is
predominantly used to provide goods and services that benet more narrowly dened
groups than do the primary tasks of local governments. Hence, we expect that a voter's
benet of being pivotal, BL
l;i, increases with hydropower income.9 On the other hand,
if income stimulates political participation through this channel, equilibrium turnout
will increase, and the probability of being pivotal will decline with income, @pL
l =@Il <
0. However, this second-order eect can only dampen, not overturn, the total impact
of income on the instrumental incentive to vote in the local government election, and
pL
l @BL
l =@Il + BL@pL
l =@Il > 0 if @BL
l;i=@Il > 0.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
From (3) we know that in a simple regression of local turnout, T L








the coecient L captures the selection eect of income in addition to the instrumental
eect we are interested in. To handle this, we therefore consider the dierence between











9This argument, and in particular the conditions for @BL
l;i=@Il > 0 to hold, is more formally addressed
in the Appendix.
12where the superscript LR denotes that we are studying the dierence between local and
regional elections. From (4) and the ensuing discussion, it follows that specication (6)
will identify how hydropower income aects the instrumental incentive to vote if the
selection dierence is (on average) zero (in the model, if s
Y
l = 0).
On the other hand, if the selection dierence is non-zero, we may suer from the
selection problem even with specication (6). We would therefore like to infer the severity
of this potential problem. To do this we partition the vector Yl into observables, Xl, and





















l are the selection dierences for Xl and Zl, respectively. Hence, when






l =  + 
LRIl + Xl + "
LR
l , (7)
our estimate of LR will be contaminated by a selection eect only through s
Z
l . A
comparison of estimates of LR from specications 6 and 7 then allows us to assess the
importance of selection on unobservables. If we include variables which we a priori expect
to be important for voter behavior, and nd that this leaves LR basically unaltered, then
it is unlikely that unobservable variables bias LR. A more formal argument along these
lines is given in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005).
134 Data and Econometric Specication
4.1 The Sample
The local and regional governments in Norway are headed by councils elected through
open-list proportional representation (PR).10 Voters can aect the election outcome by
voting for a party list and by casting preferential votes for particular candidates. Can-
didates are elected based on the votes they individually receive.11 This is in contrast to
closed-list PR systems, where candidates are elected strictly according to the order in
which the party have nominated them.
Elections for both the local and the regional governments take place every four years.
Local governments choose whether elections will take place over one or two days. The
election outcomes we analyze are based on elections held on September 9-10, 2007. The
regional governments (n = 19) are, like the local governments, multi-purpose authorities,
but with more limited tasks. Their primary responsibilities are providing upper secondary
education, roads, and transportation.
At the local and regional level of government there are 7 main political parties. In
addition there are some independent lists (that is, local lists that are independent of the
traditional political parties) that receive substantial support in some of the local elections
in our sample. Independent lists are more issue-oriented than traditional party lists and
are frequently based on internal geographic divides within the bounds of the municipality
(Aars and Ringkjb (2005)).
The mayor is the key player in the local government. In about 90 percent of the
local governments, the mayor is elected by the members of the local government at the
10The mathematical formula used to translate votes into seats in Norwegian elections is the modied
Saint-Lag ue method.
11At the local government level parties have the option to give some candidates an increased share of
the poll (a maximum of 25 percent of the total number of votes received by the party's list). Together
with preferential votes, which voters may cast to candidates on any party list, this is the basis for the
distribution of seats. At the regional level the parties cannot give candidates an increased share of the
poll, and preferential votes cannot be given to candidates from other lists. The voters may however
aect the ordering of candidates at dierent lists, but for this to overrule the ordering proposed by the
party prior to the election, a candidate must receive a preferential vote from at least eight percent of the
party's electors.
14beginning of the election term. The remaining 10 percent hold direct elections for mayor
together with the ordinary local elections. The mayor cannot be removed during his or
her election term of oce.
In Norwegian politics, the main political divide is between the social democratic left
bloc and the conservative right bloc. In the 2007{2011 election period, 44 percent of
the mayors are from the left-wing bloc, 50 percent are from the right-wing bloc, and 6
percent are from independent lists.
The dataset used in this analysis consists of a cross section of Norwegian local govern-
ments in 2007. The total number of local governments was 431 that year, but we lose ve
observations for various reasons.12 Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for all variables
used in the analysis.
4.2 Econometric Specication
We follow the empirical strategy explained in section 3, and base our inference on the
dierence between turnout in the local and regional elections using the specications in
equation (7). In the vector of controls, Xl, we include the richest set we have available of
the characteristics suggested by the literature as important determinants of voter turnout
(see footnote 6).
First, we include in the vector of controls various measures capturing population char-
acteristics. In particular, we include the size and age distribution of the electorate, as well
as the distribution of educational and marital status within the population. We also in-
clude variables capturing population size and density, and recent immigration (measured
as the number of people moving into the municipality in 2006 relative to the size of the
population). Furthermore, we include the average wage level (measured in NOK 100,000,
approximately USD 15,000) for men and women, respectively. Finally in this category
of controls we include two measures that proxy for social capital, namely donations per
12Two local governments (Kristiansund and Frei) merged January 1 2008, two local governments have
implemented parliamentary systems (Oslo and Bergen), and we lack data on property taxation for one
local government (Torsken).
15capita (NOK) collected during the country's annual televised charity fundraiser, and the
number of church services attended per capita.
Second, we include controls for various institutional characteristics of each local gov-
ernment: whether elections were held during one or two days (dummy), whether there
are direct local elections for the mayor or not (dummy), the party fragmentation of the
local government based on the previous local election, and whether an independent list
exists for the local election (dummy). These political institutional characteristics are
potentially endogenous to voter turnout and are not included in all specications.13
Finally, we include region xed eects, which implies that all inference comes from






l = R + 
LRIl + Xl + "
LR
l , (8)
where R is the region xed eect and "LR
l is an error term.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics on Voting Behavior
In the local elections the average voter turnout is 64 percent, while the average turnout
in the regional elections is 58 percent. In fact, throughout the sample, the turnout in the
regional election is lower than turnout in the local government election. The maximum
deviation between the two is 20 percentage points.
As mentioned above, voting for a party list is not the only way to inuence the
composition of the local government. An alternative is to cast preferential votes for
favored candidates (or to delete unfavored candidates from the party list). The option to
alter the party list is utilized by 51 percent of voters in the local election and by 29 percent
of voters in the regional election as captured by the variables PreferentialVotesLocal and
13For a detailed description of all variables included in the analysis, see Table 14 in the Appendix.
16PreferentialVotesRegional; see Table 5).
5.2 Simple Correlations
As a simple rst investigation, we plot the association between voter turnout and hy-
dropower income and accompanying regression lines in Figure 1. We see that turnout
in both the local and the regional elections correlate positively with hydropower income
(upper and middle panel, respectively). The association is strongest for the local election.
The slope of the regression lines based on the local and regional elections are 0:23 and
0:09 (both statistically signicant at the 1-percent level).
In the bottom panel of Figure 1 we plot the association between our main outcome
variable, the dierence in turnout for the two elections (Dturnout), and hydropower
income. The slope of the regression line is 0:14 and statistically signicant at the 1-
percent level.
5.3 Contrasting Turnout in the Two Coinciding Elections
In Table 6 we analyze the dierence between turnout in the two elections using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) to estimate variants of equation (8). The variants dier by which
variables we include in our set of controls.
We start out with specication (1) where we do not include any control variables,
equivalent to the regression line displayed in the lower panel of Figure 1. We then add
control variables in four steps: Specication (2) includes region dummies, specication
(3) includes a control variable for the size of the electorate, and specication (4) includes
the full battery of the population characteristics we have available. Finally, specication
(5) is augmented with political institutional variables.
All specications give a positive and statistically highly signicant estimate for the
eect of hydropower tax income. In the richest specication the point estimate is 0:11,
statistically signicant at the 1-percent level. Quantitatively, this implies that if revenues
17from hydropower taxes increase by NOK 9;000 (USD 1;500) per capita, the turnout
dierence rises with about one percentage point. Alternatively, when hydropower tax
revenues rise from the minimum (0) to the maximum (NOK 52;000, or USD 9;000)
observed level, the turnout dierence increases by about 6 percentage points. Assuming
a baseline turnout rate at 65 percent, this implies that about one out of seven citizens who
otherwise would have abstained from voting are motivated to participate in the election.
From the \calculus of voting" model we would expect the size of the electorate to be
negatively associated with voter turnout, as the probability of an individual vote being
pivotal in the election is lower the larger is the electorate. We nd this eect in our
data. The estimates in column (3) suggest that together with regional dummies and
hydropower income, electorate size explains about 42 percent of the variation in turnout
dierence.
We have experimented with a functional form where we allow the impact of hy-
dropower income on turnout to depend on the number of voters. The interaction term
was not statistically signicant at conventional levels.14 This may imply that \prize piv-
otalness" (Schwartz (1987); Smith and Bueno de Mesquita (2010)) is empirically more
relevant than \outcome pivotalness" (Downs (1957)) in the context we examine. The
idea in Schwartz (1987) and Smith and Bueno de Mesquita (2010) is that political par-
ties depend on the continuing support of particular groups to stay in power and therefore
have incentives to cater to the same interest groups by oering local public benets.
When a party allocates rewards contingent upon group-level voting results, it motivates
group members to coordinate on supporting the party even if voters cannot individually
inuence who will win the election.
Local characteristics have limited explanatory power, as seen in column (4) of Table 6.
While several population characteristics are associated with the local government turnout
levels (see Table (13) in the Appendix), few are statistically signicant for the turnout
14Results are available upon request. That the benets from voting and the probability of casting
a decisive vote, in the traditional sense, matters independently, but not multiplicatively is in line with
survey evidence provided by Blais, Young, and Lapp (2000).
18dierence.15 Hence, turnout in the regional election seems to capture how observable
characteristics aect citizens' general motive to vote, independently of what is at stake
in the local and regional elections.
Our interest in point estimates for population characteristics follows from the discus-
sion in Section 2.4. When we nd that observable variables have negligible eect on the
turnout dierence, the possibility that omitted variables are driving our results becomes
less of a concern: the relevant omitted variable must both be appropriately correlated
with hydropower income, and aect turnout far more strongly than do our observables.
Furthermore, by comparing point estimates of hydropower tax income in specication (1)
and (4) of Table 6, we learn that omitted variables must reduce this point estimate by
almost six times as much as our full list of controls, including population size and region
xed eects, to make it disappear. This seems unlikely.
Although omitted variables are unlikely to be driving our main result, there is one
factor that could impact our estimates: the cost of voting. Once an individual is inside
the voting booth, part of the voting cost (in our model, C) is sunk. It is therefore
reasonable to expect that if hydropower income motivates individuals to participate in
the local election, some of these people will cast a vote in the regional election too. The
upward sloping relationship between hydropower income and regional turnout in Figure
1 is consistent with this behavior. Hence, our point estimates may be interpreted as a
lower bound of how hydropower income aects turnout via the instrumental incentive to
vote.
15Local governments with a large number of recent immigrants tend to have a lower turnout dierence.
This eect is statistically signicant at the ve percent level in specication (4). Most likely, this captures
that newcomers are less rooted in their community and consequently are less likely to vote at the local
election (Geys (2006a); Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2009)).
195.4 Independent Lists: Special Interests and Cognitive Costs of
Voting
The broad hypothesis behind our study is that when hydropower tax revenue equips
local governments with more discretionary funds to distribute, individuals are motivated
to seek political inuence through voting. An alternative means for inuencing politics
is to create a local list, independent of the nationwide political parties. Indeed, the
conventional understanding of independent lists in Norway is that these are initiated
when there are particularly controversial issues of extending beyond the conventional
partisan divide (Aars and Ringkjb (2005)), and our evidence in Section 2 indicates
that the room for special interest politics at the local level is particularly large when
hydropower tax revenue is high. Furthermore, one might hypothesize that when the
party structure for the local election diers from the regional election, the cognitive cost
of deciding who to vote for at the regional level increases. If this is the case, a mechanism
behind our ndings may be that hydropower stimulates the turnout dierence through
the emergence of independent lists, and voters are more vested in inuencing the outcome
in this contest rather than the regional election.
To assess this possibility, we have controlled for whether the set of parties partici-
pating in the local and regional elections diered. The dummy PartyIndepLists equals
1 if independent lists participated, and is 0 otherwise.16 We see from Table 6 that the
estimated coecient is positive, as expected. Importantly, however, the impact of hy-
dropower income is basically unaltered when this control variable is included|compare
specication (4) and (5). Hence, the reason hydropower income stimulates the turnout
dierence is not that it makes independent lists emerge.
However, the existence of independent lists may still be relevant for the interpretation
of our results. If hydropower income triggers people to vote in the local election, they
automatically sink the cost of going to the polling booth for the regional election, but
16We only consider local party lists that got votes sucient to gain at least one seat in the local council
(41 percent of the local governments fullled this criteria). The results are similar if we consider local
lists that got at least one vote (53 percent of the local governments).
20not the cognitive cost of choosing which party to support in that election. Consequently,
hydropower income may to a larger extent incentivize individuals to vote in just the
local election, rather than both elections, when the set of available party lists is dierent
in the two elections (for instance in local elections where coattail voting is expected
to be less prominent). To address this hypothesis, we introduce an interaction term
between PartyIndepLists and hydropower income. The results are given in Table 7. The
interaction term is positive and statistically signicant at the 5-percent level. In fact,
if we compare these results to the baseline results reported in Table 6, we see that the
estimates from that specication are strongly driven by local electoral districts where the
party lists available are not the same for the two elections. This result is conrmed when
we split the sample according to the presence of independent lists.17
We interpret the interaction eect as conrmation that by focusing on the turnout
dierence, we estimate a lower bound for how hydropower income aects the incentive to
vote because part of the cost of participating in the regional election is sunk if the voter
is already at the polls to participate in the local election. When the cognitive cost of
voting in the regional election is high this issue is less important. Hence, the sum of the
direct eect and the interaction eect in Table 7 is likely to be a better representation of
how hydropower income impacts turnout. This eect is then 0.16 rather than 0.11 as in
the baseline specication.
6 Preferential Votes
As an extension of our main analysis we consider a dierent dimension of political par-
ticipation and its connection to hydropower income: the use of preferential votes. As
explained in Section 4.1, voters in local elections may cast \side votes" for a specic
candidate on any party list. A similar, but not identical, feature exists for the regional
election. Clearly, this option constitutes an alternative way for voters to aect election
17Details are available upon request.
21outcomes.
We follow the empirical approach laid out in Section 4, but we now use the share of
votes that have been corrected (in percentage points) as the dependent variable. In Table
8 we contrast vote correcting behavior at the local level to vote correcting behavior at
the regional level (that is, estimates on Equation (8) with the dierence in corrected vote
shares as the dependent variable).
This exercise yields a positive eect of hydropower income, which is statistically sig-
nicant at the 5-percent level. The point estimate is 0:17, indicating that if hydropower
tax revenues were to increase from the minimal to the maximum level in our sample,
that is from 0 to NOK 52;000 (USD 9000), the share of votes that are corrected would
increase with about 9 percentage points.
In contrast to the cost of voting for a party, an individual's cognitive cost of casting
a preferential vote in the regional election should not be aected by the existence of
independent lists. Hence, if the eects of independent lists in section 2.4 really are due to
the cognitive costs of voting, they should not turn up for preferential votes. We therefore
test whether an interaction term between PartyIndepLists and hydropower income does
aect the number of preferential votes. The interaction eect is not statistically dierent
from zero (see Table 9).
7 Sensitivity Checks
Areas with substantial hydropower income typically are sparsely populated. To ensure
that our results are not driven by some omitted population size variable we have ex-
perimented with a more homogenous sample, where we only include local governments
with less than 10,000 inhabitants. In Table 10 we provide results from this exercise for
the specications where all covariates are included and voter turnout is the dependent
variable.
For ease of comparison we reproduce our baseline results for specication (1) in Table
2210. As is evident from the tables, our results do not change much when excluding local
governments with population size above 10,000 (specication (2)). We have also investi-
gated to what extent our results are driven by outliers by applying a robust regressions
method, which we report in specication (3).18 We also report results from robust regres-
sions on the more homogenous sample (specication (4)). The point estimate is smaller
in specication (3) relative to our baseline estimate from specication (1). However, in all
specications, we nd that the impact of hydropower revenues is statistically signicant
at the 1-percent level.
8 Endogeneity
When assessing the causal eect of election stakes, a challenge is that these stakes gener-
ally are not exogenous, but will depend on the policies chosen by politicians in response
to scal needs, personal popularity and so on.19 To circumvent this problem, we have
used a research design where such policy endogeneity is unlikely to be a concern since
hydropower income is largely determined by geographical factors. However, as noted
in Section 2.1, local governments do have the option whether or not to levy commercial
property taxes, they can choose to set the tax rate below the maximum rate (even though
few do), and there are also some local governments receiving commercial property tax
revenue from non-hydropower sources (such as the petroleum and shery industries).
To investigate whether endogeneity poses a threat to our identication strategy we rely
on instrumental variable techniques where we employ measures of topographic variation
as instruments for hydropower income. More specically, we use ve variables capturing
variations in altitude across local governments.
As documented in our rst stage regression, reported in Table 11, there is a positive
relationship between altitude and hydropower income. The F-test of the excluded in-
18The robust regression iteratively re-weights observations to reduce the importance of outliers. We
implement it with STATA's rreg command.
19Besley and Case (2000) oer a general discussion of bias due to policy endogeneity.
23struments indicate that the instruments are relevant (with an F statistic of about 10).
Furthermore, the second stage results, reported in Table 12, lend support to our main
nding: local hydropower revenues do seem to stimulate local political participation. The
estimated eects are stronger than what we reported in our baseline specication, and
they are statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the 1-percent level.20
9 Conclusion
We have found that in communities where windfall gains from hydropower production
equip the local government with extra funds to distribute, more people vote in the local
rather than in the regional election, even though both elections are held simultaneously.
It is reasonable to view this eect as causal, both because the eligible voting populations
are the same for the two elections and because the estimated eect hardly changes as we
include a rich set of observable variables.
Our interpretation of the local revenue eect is that when more wealth is controlled
by the local government, the elected ocials have more exibility to pursue targeted
spending programs. Thus, individuals have a stronger incentive to participate in the
political process so as to inuence the direction of the spending. Consequently, some
individuals who otherwise would not have participated, are are motivated to vote at the
election. Viewed through the lens of the basic election turnout framework, the \calculus
of voting" model of Downs (1957), this is evidence that the instrumental incentive to vote
indeed matters for turnout rates.
Because our empirical strategy is constructed to establish causality rather than to dis-
tinguish between competing models, other mechanisms than those in the plain Downsian
model of turnout may also be valid. To us, a particularly plausible alternative explana-
tion is that public sector wealth increase the rents from holding oce and thus stimulates
candidates' eorts to mobilize voters in the race for oce (as in Schachar and Nalebu
20For our most elaborate specication, a Wu-Hausman test fails to reject the assumption of exogeneity
of hydropower income (p = 0:064).
24(1999)). The instrumental incentive is thus moved up one link in the explanatory chain,
from individual voters to parties. In order to reveal and identify the exact mechanism
from windfall gains to voter turnout, however, detailed micro-level data is required. We
plan to pursue this question in future research.
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28Figure 1: The Relationship Between Voter Turnout and Hydropower Income (per capita)
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29Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Public Spending in NOK 1,000 per capita
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PerCapita ChildCare 5.523 2.662 2.743 44.848
PerCapita Schooling 14.961 4.077 9.347 42.926
PerCapita ElderlyCare 17.212 5.26 8.061 50.306
PerCapita Fire 0.894 0.654 0.073 7.538
PerCapita Infrastructure 3.569 1.984 0 13.459
PerCapita Administration 5.963 3.443 1.703 30.776
PerCapita SocialAssistance 4.665 2.328 1.393 29.439
PerCapita Health 2.809 1.442 1.156 11.801
PerCapita Culture 3.482 4.222 0.925 49.666
PerCapita IndustrySupport 1.885 2.568 0.015 30.098
PerCapita Planning 1.141 1.004 0.046 10.976
PerCapita Roads 1.984 1.866 0.329 17.928
N 426
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Shares of Public Spending
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Share ChildCare 8.540 2.864 3.77 20.095
Share Schooling 22.819 4.566 11.079 45.949
Share ElderlyCare 25.853 4.794 9.65 46.039
Share Fire 1.32 0.76 0.096 10.549
Share Infrastructure 5.342 2.35 0 16.731
Share Administration 8.487 2.758 3.243 22.686
Share SocialAssistance 7.046 2.538 1.492 25.19
Share Health 4.077 1.381 1.887 13.502
Share Culture 4.784 3.293 1.652 31.396
Share IndustrySupport 2.443 2.164 0.029 15.352
Share Planning 1.65 0.945 0.086 7.576



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
TurnoutLocal 64.051 5.488 51.224 82.189 426
TurnoutRegional 57.81 5.019 43.036 78.616 426
DTurnout 6.241 3.059 0.638 20 426
PreferentialVotesLocal 51.405 13.076 23.093 91.473 426
PreferentialVotesRegional 28.925 8.83 14.033 64.012 426
DPreferentialVotes 22.48 10.093 -8.236 62.92 426
HydroPowerIncome 2.197 5.761 0 52.079 426
lnVotingPopulation 8.199 1.093 5.088 11.755 426
VotingPopulation 7025.803 11642.053 162 127338 426
Population 9071.353 15003.096 214 161730 426
ShareInRuralAreas 0.493 0.274 0.007 1 426
RecentImmigrants 0.045 0.016 0.014 0.093 426
ShareVotersAged18to37 0.297 0.035 0.185 0.398 426
ShareVotersAged38to57 0.354 0.022 0.284 0.423 426
ShareVotersAged58to77 0.252 0.03 0.159 0.361 426
ShareVotersAged77plus 0.097 0.024 0.041 0.171 426
ShareWomen 0.497 0.01 0.449 0.52 426
ShareUnMarried 0.488 0.031 0.384 0.642 426
ShareWidow 0.067 0.016 0.03 0.115 426
ShareDivorced 0.075 0.018 0.032 0.122 426
ShareLowerSecondaryEducation 0.348 0.066 0.173 0.592 426
ShareUpperSecondaryEducation 0.445 0.045 0.243 0.552 426
CharityDonations 47.338 15.237 23.9 159.33 426
ChurchServiceAttendance 1.838 0.676 0.539 4.521 422
GrossWageMen 3.216 0.444 2.016 5.306 426
GrossWageWomen 2.056 0.183 1.702 2.944 426
DirectElectionMayor 0.117 0.322 0 1 426
TwoVotingDays 0.481 0.5 0 1 426
PartyFragmentation 0.747 0.098 0 0.859 424
PartyIndepLists 0.406 0.492 0 1 426
Altitude0to299 0.531 0.353 0 1 424
Altitude300to599 0.227 0.189 0 0.951 424
Altitude600to899 0.127 0.161 0 0.815 424
Altitude900to1199 0.075 0.134 0 0.593 424
Altitude1200 0.04 0.119 0 0.785 424
33Table 6: The Relationship Between Hydropower Income and Voter Turnout, Local Rel-
ative to Regional Election Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)








































N 426 426 426 422 420
adj. R2 0.071 0.244 0.424 0.458 0.480
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
34Table 7: The Relationship Between Hydropower Income and Voter Turnout, Local Rela-
tive to Regional Election Results. Hydropower Income Eect Allowed to be Conditional
on the Existence of Independent Local Lists.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
HydroXPartyIndepLists 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.11
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
PartyIndepLists 1.01 0.81 0.77 0.77
(0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
lnVotingPopulation -1.41 -1.40 -1.39 -1.52
(0.13) (0.15) (0.27) (0.28)
ShareInRuralAreas -0.23 -0.43
(0.79) (0.81)
N 426 426 422 420
adj. R2 0.323 0.444 0.483 0.487
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes
Population Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Institutional Characteristics No No No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
35Table 8: The Relationship Between Hydropower Income and Preferantial Voting, Local
Relative to Regional Election Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.55 0.46 0.17 0.19 0.17
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)








































N 426 426 426 422 420
adj. R2 0.096 0.246 0.562 0.597 0.620
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
36Table 9: The Relationship Between Hydropower Income and Preferantial Voting, Local
Relative to Regional Election Results. Hydropower Income Eect Allowed to be Condi-
tional on the Existence of Independent Local Lists.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.31 0.18 0.15 0.12
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
HydroXPartyIndepLists -0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.08
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
PartyIndepLists 1.69 2.15 1.61 1.68
(0.77) (0.73) (0.72) (0.71)
lnVotingPopulation -5.96 -5.99 -5.06 -5.30
(0.35) (0.37) (0.74) (0.80)
ShareInRuralAreas 7.75 7.21
(2.24) (2.26)
N 426 426 422 420
adj. R2 0.473 0.570 0.601 0.620
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes
Population Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Institutional Characteristics No No No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 10: Sensitivity Checks: The Relationship Between Hydropower Income and Voter
Turnout, Local Relative to Regional Election Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ShareInRuralAreas -0.51 -1.03 -1.17 -1.35
(0.82) (0.88) (0.58) (0.72)
lnVotingPopulation -1.58 -1.62 -1.23 -1.34
(0.27) (0.41) (0.21) (0.34)
N 420 320 420 320
adj. R2 0.480 0.379 0.551 0.395
Regional Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institutional Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
ExcludedObservations None Pop> 10;000 None Pop> 10;000
EstimationMethod OLS OLS Robust reg. Robust reg.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
37Table 11: Local Government Altitude as Instrument for Hydropower Income, First-Stage
Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Altitude300to599 -1.36 2.31 2.03 4.53 4.81
(0.95) (1.61) (1.57) (1.65) (1.74)
Altitude600to899 7.05 7.02 5.96 6.94 6.47
(3.41) (2.88) (2.74) (2.27) (2.39)
Altitude900to1199 4.65 10.67 9.84 12.25 13.37
(5.67) (5.16) (5.01) (3.42) (3.77)
Altitude1200 10.20 11.77 10.96 12.35 11.95
(5.75) (5.22) (5.15) (3.74) (3.80)




N 424 424 424 420 420
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Characteristics No No No Yes Yes
Institutional Characteristics No No No No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 12: The Relationship Between Hydropower Income and Voter Turnout, Local Rel-
ative to Regional Election Results, Second-Stage Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.30 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.21
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)




N 424 424 424 420 420
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Characteristics No No No Yes Yes
Institutional Characteristics No No No No Yes
F-statistic from 1st. 8.288 9.744 10.07 11.18 11.25
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3810 Appendix
10.1 The Eect of Hydropower Income on Election Stakes
Here we give a simple formalization of how a municipality's income may aect citizen's
instrumental incentive to vote.
We assume that a local government may use its income I to provide core welfare
services to its citizens and to nance targeted spending (\pork"). Candidates dier by
which composition of core services they will provide, and which composition of targeted
spending they will choose, if elected. Denote by Gj;i the basket of core services provided
by candidate j, normalized by the preferences of voter i. Hence, if voter i prefers the
composition of general goods provided by candidate j over the composition provided
by candidate k, and both candidates spend equally much on core public goods, then
Gj;i > Gk;i. Denote by Tj;i the targeted spending provided by candidate j to voter i.
Voters' preferences over spending are given by U (Gj;i;Tj;i), which is separable, increasing
and concave in each argument: U1 > 0, U11 < 0;U2 > 0, U22 < 0, U12 = 0. We assume
that candidate j will target spending at individual i, whereas other candidates will not.
Hence, Tj;i > 0 and T j;i = 0. Finally, we assume that that the candidate who targets
individual i with pork also is the candidate who oers the basket of core services that i
prefers the most: Gj;i > G j;i.
Denote by Bi individual i's utility from having his most preferred candidate, j, in
oce rather than someone else. We may express this benet as
Bi = U (Gj;i;Tj;i)   U (G j;i;T j;i).



















From this expression we see that higher hydropower income is likely to have two opposing
39eects on the instrumental incentive to vote (Bi). First, if
@Tj;i
@I > 0 higher income raises
the instrumental incentive to vote by facilitating more non-core spending. On the other
hand, if both
@Gj;i
@I > 0 and
@G j;i
@I > 0, then higher income may reduce Bi, since concavity
of U implies that @U
@Gj;i < @U
@G j;i. It follows that higher income is more likely to raise the
instrumental incentive to vote, the more strongly higher income tends to be spent on
pork rather than on core welfare services.
The argument above relates to the traditional way of viewing pivotalness (i.e., \out-
come pivotalness"). An alternative type of pivotalness that has been forwarded in the
literature is \prize pivotalness" (Smith and Bueno de Mesquita (2010)). If parties are
able to observe group-level voting, they can make targeted spending decisions contingent
on the voting pattern and thus motivate voters to turn out even when they are highly
unlikely to aect who wins the election. Note that both of these two types of pivotalness
requires spending to be targeted, in the sense that it benets some voters, but not others.
Furthermore, in our discussion we have implicitly assumed that voters are certain about
what candidates will do once in oce. Schwartz (1987) discusses the role of targeted
spending versus \global public benets" when the credibility of campaign promises is an
issue, and argues that targeted spending will stimulate the instrumental incentive to vote
more strongly than will non-targeted spending.
40Table 13: Simple Cross Sectional Estimates: The Relationship Between Hydropower
Income and Voter Turnout at the Local Election.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
HydroPowerIncome 0.23 0.17 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)








































N 426 426 426 422 420
adj. R2 0.057 0.120 0.475 0.578 0.587
Regional Fixed Eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
41Table 14: Variable Description
TurnoutLocal Casted votes relative to the total number of eligible voters
at the local (municipal) election, percentage points.
TurnoutRegional Casted votes relative to the total number of eligible voters
at the regional (county) election, percentage points.
DTurnout TurnoutLocal - TurnoutRegional
PreferentialVotesLocal Share of votes that have been corrected at the local (municipal) election.
PreferentialVotesRegional Share of votes that have been corrected at the regional (county) election.
DPreferentialVotes PreferentialVotesLocal - PreferentialVotesRegional
HydroPowerIncome Revenues from commercial property taxation, NOK 1000 per capita
VotingPopulation The number of eligible voters (January 1, 2007)
ShareInRuralAreas Fraction of the population living in rural areas (January 1, 2007)
RecentImmigrants Fraction of population that migrated to the municipality during 2006
ShareVotersAgedXXtoYY Fraction of eligible voters aged XX to YY (January 1, 2007)
ShareWomen Fraction of women in the population (January 1st, 2007)
ShareUnMarried Fraction of population that are unmarried (January 1, 2007)
ShareWidow Fraction of population that are widowed (January 1, 2007)
ShareDivorced Fraction of population that are divorced (January 1st, 2007)
ShareLowerSecondaryEducation Fraction of population aged 16 above with lower secondary education
as highest education (October 1, 2007)
ShareUpperSecondaryEducation Fraction of population aged 16 above with upper secondary education
as highest education (October 1, 2007)
CharityDonations Donations per capita (NOK) at annual TV charity show, Oct. 22, 2006.
(donations went to Doctors Without Borders)
ChurchServiceAttendance Number of church services attended, per capita, 2007.
GrossWageMen Average gross wage for men 17 years and older, 2006.
GrossWageWomen Average gross wage for women 17 years and older, 2006.
DirectElectionMayor Dummy=1 if the municipality hold direct elections for the mayor
TwoVotingDays Dummy=1 if the municipality have two voting days
PartyFragmentation 1 - (Herndahl index of party fragmentation
in the local council at the 2003 election)
The Herndahl-index is generally given by 1/P , when the
representatives are equally divided among P parties.
PartyIndepLists Dummy=1 if the municipality had at least one party independent list,
that obtained at least one seat in the local council
Altitude0to299 Fraction of local government area 0 to 299 meters above sea level.
Altitude300to599 Fraction of local government area 300 to 599 meters above sea level.
Altitude600to899 Fraction of local government area 600 to 899 meters above sea level.
Altitude900to1199 Fraction of local government area 900 to 1199 meters above sea level.
Altitude1200 Fraction of local government area 1200 meters or more above sea level.
Note: Election variables are from September 2007, unless otherwise noted. The data are provided by the
Norwegian Social Science Data Services and Statistics Norway. Neither of these institutions are responsible
for the analyzes conducted or for the conclusions drawn.
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